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Abstract
We augment a standard macroeconomic model by ac-
counting for the fact that central banks supply money
only in exchange for eligible assets. Monetary policy
implementation then matters for the pass-through of
policy rate changes and rationalizes liquidity premia on
treasuries. The model explains the observed negative
relation between corporate bond yield spreads and the
amount of available treasuries. Liquidity premia on eli-
gible assets further provide a structural explanation for
the systematic wedge between the policy rate and the
consumption Euler rate that standard models equate.
Nonetheless, monetary policy e¤ects on real activity and
ination are consistent with broad empirical evidence.
JEL classication: E52; E58; E43; E44; E32.
Keywords: Monetary policy transmission; Open market
operations; Treasury debt liquidity premium; Consump-
tion Euler rate.
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1 Introduction
It is well-established that prices of assets are a¤ected by their liquidity, i.e. the degree to
which they facilitate market transactions, such that liquidity premia contribute to interest
rate spreads.3 During the recent nancial crises, central banks have proven to be able to
a¤ect interest rates at various maturities by introducing lending facilities and direct asset
purchases,4 suggesting that central banks asset acquisition policies can be relevant for asset
pricing in non-crisis times as well. The fact that central banks typically supply reserves only
in exchange for a particular set of securities should be internalized by rational investors,
leading to a liquidity premium between interest rates on non-eligible and eligible assets, like
short-term treasuries. According to this view, monetary policy implementation is causal for
the existence of liquidity premia on treasuries, which has not been taken into account in
the macroeconomic literature.5 In this paper, we examine the role of monetary policy for
the existence and the dynamics of the liquidity premium on short-term treasuries within a
macroeconomic model. We show how interest rate spreads are a¤ected by monetary policy
consistent with empirical evidence, and we demonstrate that endogenous liquidity premia
can be relevant for monetary transmission.
We present a simple framework which di¤ers from standard macroeconomic models only
by specifying money supply as an asset exchange, which is usually neglected in contempo-
raneous macroeconomic models (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007). The central bank is
assumed to supply money against eligible assets, while private agents internalize the eligibil-
ity of di¤erent assets when they invest. In equilibrium, the interest rate on an eligible asset,
i.e. short-term treasuries, closely follows the interest rate the central bank charges when it
purchases this asset, and it di¤ers from interest rates on non-eligible assets by a liquidity
premium.6 We show that this model can explain three observations: i:) the negative correla-
tion between the liquidity premium (based on corporate bond yield spreads) and the supply
of treasuries, which has been documented by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012),
ii:) the negative correlation between the consumption Euler equation residual and the Fed-
3See e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (2001), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), or Lagos (2010), where liquidity
also does not refer to the ease with which assets can be resold.
4See Fleming (2012) for an overview of US Federal Reserve liquidity provision policies in 2007-2009.
5The liquidity of assets has been considered for various purposes in Bansal and Coleman (1996), Canzoneri
et al. (2008), Lagos (2010, 2011), Shi (2012), Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). Liquidity premia emerge in these
studies because assets provide transaction services to di¤erent degrees, whereas monetary policy matters
for asset prices in equilibrium rather than for the private agentsinvestment decision.
6To be more precise, there are two interest rate di¤erentials due to the liquidity of assets: the spread
between the rates of return on money and treasuries, and the spread between the rates of return on non-
eligible assets and the treasury rate. Throughout the paper, we will focus on the latter.
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eral Funds rate, as shown by Canzoneri et al. (2007) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2009), and
iii:) the fact that this residual, which is also known as a risk premium shock(see Smets
and Wouters, 2008), is more volatile than the Euler rate itself, which has been stressed by
Chari et al. (2009).7
The majority of macroeconomic studies on monetary policy focusses on a short-run
interest rate as the central banks operating target, which impacts on the private sector
behavior by a¤ecting intertemporal substitution, i.e. by relating the policy rate to ination
and consumption growth via the consumption Euler equation. The well-known failure of
the consumption Euler equation to explain the magnitude of risk-free interest rates (see
Weil, 1989) has until now typically been neglected in standard macroeconomics models,
where the policy and the treasury rate are assumed to equal the (consumption) Euler rate.8
Moreover, the consumption Euler equation residual, i.e. the spread between the Euler rate
and the Federal Funds rate, is typically more volatile than the Euler rate (see Chari et al.,
2009) and is found to be negatively related to the Federal Funds rate (see Canzoneri et
al., 2007, and Atkeson and Kehoe, 2009), which cast severe doubts on the assumed identity
between the Euler rate and the Federal Funds rate in standard models. We show analytically
and quantitatively that these observations can be reconciled within our macroeconomic
framework, where changes in the policy rate are due to the liquidity premium not one-
for-one passed through to all short-term interest rates. Moreover, we show that the liquidity
premium varies endogenously with the availability of treasuries relative to real activity, like
in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).
The model is specied in a stylized way to facilitate the derivation of analytical results.
In particular, demand for liquidity/cash is induced by a simple cash-in-advance constraint
for the benchmark model, which is replaced by a money-in-the-utility-function specication
to assess the robustness of the results (see section 5.4). The model essentially di¤ers from
conventional New Keynesian models by two key assumptions: First, open market operations
are separated from the asset market, where agents trade which each other and with the
government. Before the asset market opens, private agents can acquire cash in open market
operations from the central bank in exchange for eligible securities discounted with the policy
rate. Eligible assets that are bought today can therefore be cashed in the next period, such
that their rate of return closely follows to the expected future policy rate. Second, we
7Chari et al. (2009) suspect that this shock is hardly likely to be invariant to monetary policy, which
accords to the idea presented in this paper.
8Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) and Eisfeldt (2007) also argue that the demand for short-term treasury
securities (T-bills) cannot solely be explained with consumption smoothing, and suggest considering a
transactions demand for liquid assets.
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account for common central bank practice (like the Feds or the BoEs in non-crisis times)
and assume that only short-term treasuries are eligible in open market operations (T-
bills only),9 while other assets like equity or corporate bonds are not accepted by the
central bank.10 Given that access to money relies on holdings of treasuries, private agents
demand a (il-)liquidity premium on non-eligible assets. A higher policy rate then raises
the price of money in terms of treasuries and therefore leads to a decline in the liquidity
premium consistent with Canzoneri et al.s (2007) and Atkeson and Kehoes (2009) ndings.
Moreover, the liquidity premium is shown to be more volatile than the Euler rate, providing
a structural explanation of the volatility of risk premium shock in Smets and Wouters
(2007). The second assumption further implies that changes in the supply of treasuries can
alter private agents access to reserves. An increase in treasuries relative to real activity
thereby reduces the valuation of liquidity and thus the liquidity premium, which accords to
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensens (2012) result regarding the role of liquidity for the
treasury yields.11
These assumptions imply a monetary transmission mechanism that di¤ers from the way
real activity is a¤ected by monetary policy in standard New Keynesian models, where the
rate of intertemporal substitution equals the real policy rate. Consider, for example, an
unexpected increase in the policy rate. Private agents, who are willing to hold both money
and treasuries, then demand a higher treasury rate to be compensated for higher costs of
acquiring new money in the next period, such that the treasury rate follows the expected
future policy rate, which accords to empirical evidence, e.g., by Simon (1990).12 Due to the
cash constraint, aggregate demand positively depends on available means of payment, while
access to the latter is constrained by the amount of privately held treasuries discounted
with the current policy rate. A higher policy rate reduces the discounted value of treasuries
and has, thereby, a contractionary e¤ect on aggregate demand and ination. Given that
9Accepting other assets than T-bills was, for example, viewed as a relevant question in 2001 in face of a
decline in the amount of outstanding US-treasury debt. See Board of Governors (2001) for a comprehensive
discussion on alternative assets that were considered for open market purchases. This issue has regained
interest in the current nancial crises, where the Fed and other central banks relaxed their asset acquisition
policy (see, e.g., Borio and Disyatat, 2009, for an overview)
10This assumption accords to the Feds asset aquisition policy before 2007. In 2006, for example, Trea-
sury bills were the largest position accounting for one-third of the System Open Market Account (SOMA)
holdings. Bills and Treasury coupon securities with a maturity below 2 years accounted for about two-third
of SOMA holdings, while treasury securities of longer maturities and a relatively small amount of Treasury
ination-indexed securities completed the porfolio.
11This result is also consistent with Friedman and Kuttners (1998) ndings on the e¤ect of relative asset
quantities for the spread between commercial papers and treasury bills.
12The spread between these rates increases on average with aggregate uncertainty and investorsrelative
risk aversion, such that the treasury rate and the policy rate di¤er due to a small risk premium.
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the liquidity premium falls, the increase in the real policy rate is not one-for-one passed
through to real rates of return on non-eligible assets, like corporate debt or equity. Since
monetary policy does not govern the rate of intertemporal substitution, consumption habits
are neither necessary nor su¢ cient for smooth consumption growth (unliek in standard
models, see Fuhrer, 2000) and reasonable investment dynamics can already be generated by
investment adjustment costs which are much smaller than suggested by estimates based on
aggregate data (like in Smets and Wouters, 2007).13
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on interest
rates and spreads. In Section 3, the model is developed. In Section 4, we provide analytical
results on the behavior of interest rates and spreads. Section 5 presents quantitative results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
In this Section, we provide an empirical analysis of interest rates and spreads, which we
will interpret as liquidity premia. We then show in the subsequent analysis how modeling
monetary policy implementation involving quantities of money and treasuries, with a small
modication from standard models, can explain the existence and behavior of these premia
while leading to conventional monetary policy e¤ects. In the rst part of this Section,
we analyze liquidity premia and their correlation with the amount of available treasuries,
which relates to the analysis of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). The second
part analyzes the spread between the consumption Euler rate and the Federal Funds rate,
relating to Canzoneri et al. (2007), Atkeson and Kehoe (2009), and Chari et al. (2009).
The results presented in this Section indicate a substantial role for monetary policy in
inuencing interest rates and spreads, providing the point of departure for our theoretical
analysis. Here, we present selected second moments of interest rates and spreads, and we
will subsequently show that they can be replicated with our model.
2.1 Interest rate on short-term treasuries
In a recent study, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) provide empirical evidence
on the role of treasuries supply for corporate bond yield spreads. They nd a negative rela-
tionship in US data between the supply of government debt and spreads between corporate
13Our model suggest investment adjustment costs of a magnitude that is consistent with empirical evidence
from disaggregate data (see Groth and Khan, 2011).
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and government debt yields.14 Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) argue that an
increase in the supply of treasuries should reduce their convenience value, representing
liquidity and safety attributes, and thereby reduce the corporate bond yield spread. For
their baseline specication, they consider the spread between yields on AAA rated corporate
bonds and yields on treasury bonds with a long maturity and the ratio of total government
debt to GDP. Given that the focus of this paper is on the role of monetary policy on interest
rate spreads, we examine correlations of slightly di¤erent variables.
When the Federal Reserve implements its interest rate target, it buys or sells assets
against reserves in open market operations. In normal times, Treasury bills are the largest
asset class held in the Federal Reserve portfolio as a result of open market operations.15
To assess the particular role of monetary policy, we analyze the behavior of the spread
between the 3-month high-grade commercial paper rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
which is also examined in Friedman and Kuttner (1998) and in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensens (2012) analysis of short-term interest rates. Using a structural asset pricing
equation, the latter estimate the impact of total stock of treasury debt relative to GDP on
that spread and argue that it reects the price of liquidity, as there has never been a default
on high grade commercial papers.16 Given that this spread reects liquidity (rather than
safety) attributes, we will assess the plausibility of our models predictions by comparing
this spread with the models counterpart.
To account for the argument that the valuation of treasuries should depend on the
amount available to the private sector, we remove the Federal Reserve holdings of 3-month
T-bills, as we want to isolate the T-bills held by the private sector (billst). The rst line
of Table 1 displays the correlation between the short-term spread sTreast , identied as the
spread between the 3-month high-grade commercial paper rate and the 3-month T-bill rate,
and the bills-to-GDP ratio, where we used the total amount of outstanding T-bills minus
the amount of T-bills held by the Federal Reserve.17 The empirical correlation is strongly
negative ( 0:62), indicating that the supply of eligible assets (T-bills) matters for the
14This result is related to Friedman and Kuttners (1998) nding that the spread between commercial
papers and treasury bills is a¤ected by the relative supply of those assets.
15See footnote 10.
16The default controls, which Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen include in their regressions explaining
that spread, are statistically not di¤erent from zero.
17The sample covers 2003-2007, with quarterly data, due to data availability and to remove the recent
nancial crisis episode. The sample can be extended back to 1970 if total outstanding T-bills instead of
privately held T-bills are considered. For the full sample (1970-2007), the correlation is less pronounced
and equals  0:36. Data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database, the U.S. Treasury,
and the Federal Reserve Board.
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Table 1: Selected emprical moments
corr
 
sTreast ; billst=gdpt
  0:62
corr (Rt; R
m
t ) 0:99
corr
 
REulert ; R
m
t

0:53
corr
 
sEulert ; R
m
t
  0:82
sd(sEulert )=sd(R
m
t ) 0:85
sd(sEulert )=sd(R
Euler
t ) 1:49
Note: Standard deviations refer to net interest rates.
spread.18 For the sake of completeness, the second line gives the correlation (0.99) between
the T-bills rate Rt and the Federal Funds rate Rmt , which is well-known to be close to unity.
Given that the Federal Reserve controls the latter and inuences the private sector holdings
of T-bills, these results suggest that monetary policy plays a crucial role for the liquidity
premium on short-term treasuries.
2.2 Consumption Euler rate
As demonstrated by Canzoneri et al. (2007), Atkeson and Kehoe (2009), and Chari et
al. (2009), the rate implied by the consumption Euler equation hardly mimics the US
monetary policy rate, i.e. the Federal Funds rate. Applying di¤erent approaches, Canzoneri
et al. (2007) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2009) both nd that the spread between the Euler
rate and the Federal Funds rate is actually negatively related to the Federal Funds rate.
Chari et al. (2009) further show that this Euler equation error is more than six times
larger than the short-term interest rate, which they view as one of several critical properties
of standard New Keynesian models.
To assess our models ability to explain this pattern, we follow Canzoneri et al. (2007)
and compute the empirical interest rate implied by standard Euler equations. According to a
standard Euler equation, the (gross) Euler rate REulert satises
1
REulert
= Et
uc;t+1
uc;t
Pt
Pt+1
, where
 is the discount factor, uc;t is marginal utility of consumption, and Pt is the aggregate price
level. With a standard CRRA utility function, leading to a marginal utility of consumption
18We nd a similar correlation with long-term spreads, as with estimates presented by Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). When supply is measured as the total government debt outstanding relative
to GDP, and the spread between yields on AAA corporate bonds and long-term government bonds is
considered, the correlation is  0:62. The sample covers 1934-2007, with yearly data. The debt-to-GDP
ratio data is from Bohn (2008).
6
uc;t = c
 
t , and under conditional log-normality the Euler equation can be written as
1
REulert
=  exp
"
  (Et log ct+1   log ct)  Et log t+1
+
2
2
vart log ct+1 +
1
2
vart log t+1 + covt (log ct+1; log t+1)
#
; (1)
where t = Pt=Pt 1. Equation (1) is used to compute the implied standard Euler rate REulert ,
where the conditional moments are estimated from a six-variable VAR , Yt = A0+A1Yt 1+vt,
assuming v s i:i:d:N (0;),  = 1 and  = :993.19 These parameters are chosen according
to our calibration strategy (see Section 5.1). The variables included in Yt (1966Q1-2007Q4)
are log per capita real personal consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services,
log change in the deator of this consumption measure, log price of industrial commodities,
log per capita real disposable personal income, Federal Funds rate, and log per capita real
non-consumption GDP.20 Moreover, a segmented (1974Q1) time trend is included in A0.
On the one hand, the Federal Funds rate and the Euler rate,21 which should be identical
according to standard macroeconomic models are positively correlated by 0:53 (see Table
1). On the other hand, the spread between the computed standard Euler interest rate and
Federal Funds rate, sEulert = R
Euler
t  Rmt is strongly negatively correlated with the Federal
Funds rate ( 0:82).22 The standard deviation of the spread between the Euler and the
policy rate is 2:78, compared to 1:87 for the Euler rate and 3:26 for the Federal Funds rate.
Hence, the spread is less volatile than the Federal Funds rate and is much more volatile
than the Euler rate; the latter relation being less pronounced than for Smets and Wouters
(2007) model, according to Chari et al. (2009).
To summarize, the spread between the Euler rate and the observed policy rate, which
are equated in standard models, exhibits two properties, i.e. a systematic co-movement
with monetary policy and a high relative volatility, which casts doubts on the validity and
the precision of the transmission mechanism of standard New Keynesian models even when
consumption habits are considered (see Atkeson and Kehoe, 2009, and Chari et al., 2009).
The following analysis will show that these observations can be explained by an endogenous
liquidity premium induced by monetary policy implementation.
19Our results di¤er slightly from Canzoneri et al. (2007), who use a CRRA utility function with  = 2.
20Data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database and are released by the Federal
Reserve Board, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce), the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor), and the Census Bureau (U.S. Department of Commerce).
21The computed Euler rate, the Federal Funds rate, and the spread between these two rates, sEulert =
REulert  Rmt , are displayed in Appendix B.2.
22This accords to Atkeson and Kehoes (2008) result of the analysis of the Euler equation error (i..e. of
 st = Rmt  REulert ) using Smets and Wouters(2007) model.
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3 The model
In this section, we develop a macroeconomic framework which can explain the results pre-
sented in the previous section. The benchmark version of the model is held deliberately
simple to facilitate comparisons with the textbook New Keynesian model (see Woodford,
2003) and to be able to derive analytical results.23 We therefore abstract from nancial
intermediation and assume that households directly trade with the central bank in open
market operations. One can interpret the set-up as a stylized specication of an economy
with nancial intermediaries which receive deposits from households, lend funds to rms (see
Section 5), and hold cash to satisfy reserve requirements and/or to meet random withdrawals
of deposits. This structure would lead to a model which is isomorphic to the one presented
below, as long as nancial frictions and costs of nancial intermediation are neglected.
Households hold short-term treasuries (i.e. one-period government bonds), equity, and
non-interest bearing money. Their demand for money is induced by assuming that goods
market transactions cannot be conducted by using credit. To allows for a transparent
specication of markets and the timing of events, we apply a basic cash-in-advance con-
straint (which is replaced by a money-in-the-utility-function specication in Section 5.4).
We consider that the central bank supplies money only in exchange for eligible securities.
Specically, we restrict our attention to the case where only short-term treasuries are eligible
in open market operations (like in Lacker, 1997), which accords to the T-bills onlyregime
of the US Federal Reserve.
Throughout the paper, upper case letters denote nominal variables and lower case letters
real variables. Though, agents are not heterogenous, we introduce indices for individual
agents (i, j, and k) to describe individual choices in a transparent way.
3.1 Timing of events
There are innitely many households, rms, and retailer indexed with i 2 [0; 1], j 2 [0; 1],
and k 2 [0; 1]. A household i enters a period t with assets carried over from the previous
period t  1 : MHi;t 1 + Bi;t 1 + Vtzi;t 1, where MHi;t  0 denotes holdings of money, Bi;t  0
one-period nominally risk-free government bonds, and zi;t 1 2 [0; 1] shares of rms valued
at the price Vt. The timing of events in each period is as follows:
1. Aggregate shocks materialize, labor is supplied by households, intermediate goods are
produced by rms and sold to retailers.
23In Section 5, the model is augmented (e.g. by habit formation and investments in physical capital) to
allow for a quantitative analysis.
8
2. Households and the central bank participate in open market operations. Here, money
is exchanged against eligible securities via outright sales/purchases and via repurchase
agreements, which are essentially collateralized loans.24 The relative price of money
Rmt (for both types of trades) is controlled by the central bank and will be called
policy rate. Assuming that only government bonds are eligible, household i faces the
following constraint:
Ii;t  Bi;t 1=Rmt ; (2)
which will be referred to as the collateral constraint. It limits the amount of new
money Ii;t that can be acquired by household i in period t. Its bond holdings then
equals Bi;t 1  Bci;t, where Bci;t denotes treasuries received by the central bank.
3. The nal goods market opens, where money is assumed to be the only accepted means
of payment. Thus, goods market expenditures are restricted by money carried over
from the previous period plus money acquired from the central bank in current period
open market operations:
Ptci;t  Ii;t +MHi;t 1; (3)
where ci;t denotes consumption purchases of the nal good and Pt the price level.
4. Before the asset market opens, current labor income is paid back in cash to households,
such that household is money holdings equals fMi;t = Ii;t +MHi;t 1 + Ptwtni;t   Ptci;t,
where wt denotes the real wage rate and ni;t working time. Further, it can repurchase
treasuries, BRi;t = R
m
t M
R
i;t, such that its bond holdings equals eBi;t = Bi;t 1 Bci;t+BRi;t.
Then, the asset market opens, where households trade money, equity, and treasuries
at the price 1=Rt subject to
(Bi;t=Rt) +M
H
i;t + Vtzi;t  eBi;t + fMi;t  Rmt MRi;t + (Vt + Pt%t) zi;t 1   Pt t + Pt't; (4)
where  t denotes lump-sum tax, %t dividends from intermediate goods producing rms,
and 't prots from retailer. The central bank reinvests its payo¤s frommaturing bonds
in new bonds and does not change money supply,
R 1
0
MHi;tdi =
R 1
0
(MHi;t 1+Ii;t MRi;t)di.
Since private agents are homogenous, we can abstract from a market for federal funds and
identify the policy rate with the price of money in open market operations. A federal funds
market would allow exchanging federal funds among heterogenous participants within the
24See Fedpoint "Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Transactions" (http://www.newyorkfed.org/ about-
thefed/ fedpoint/fed04.html)
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maintenance period, for example, to exibly respond to idiosyncratic liquidity demands.
When there are no further frictions, the price of federal funds charged between di¤erent
participants would then be equal to the price charged by the central bank, Rmt .
3.2 Private sector
Households Households are innitely lived and have identical endowments and identical
preferences. Household i maximizes the expected sum of a discounted stream of instanta-
neous utilities u :
E0
1X
t=0
tu (ci;t; ni;t) ; (5)
whereE0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and  2 (0; 1)
is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility function is assumed to satisfy
u (ci;t; ni;t) = [(c
1 
i;t   1)= (1  )]  n1+ni;t =(1 + n), where   1, n  0, and  > 0.
As described above, household i faces three constraints in each period. In open market
operations, it can acquire additional money Ii;t up to the amount of government bonds car-
ried over from the previous period Bi;t 1 discounted by Rmt (see 2). Hence, other assets (e.g.
equity) are not eligible in open market operations, which accords to the common practice
of central banks, like the BoE or the US-Fed, of restricting the set of eligible securities
mainly to short-term government debt. In principle, the central bank can also withdraw
money from the private sector (Ii;t < 0). Here, however, we focus on the empirically relevant
case where the central bank creates a structural deciencywhen it supplies money,25 by
choosing a suited relation between money supplied under repurchase agreements and under
outright sales/purchases. This implies to a su¢ ciently large fraction of money supplied
under repurchase agreements to guarantee Ii;t  0 in equilibrium (see Section 3.3).
Households are further assumed to rely on cash for transactions in the goods market (see
3). Given that they can rst trade with the central bank in open market operations, the
cash-in-advance constraint (3) di¤ers from Svenssons (1985) cash-in-advance constraint by
Ii;t. In the asset market, household i receives payo¤s from maturing bonds and dividends.
It can buy bonds from the government and invest in shares of intermediate goods producing
rms j 2 [0; 1], zi;t =
R
zji;tdj. Substituting out the stock of bonds and money held before
25This strategy has for example been applied by the US-Federal Reserve: "To most e¤ectively in-
uence the level of reserve balances, the Federal Reserve has created what is called a structural de-
ciency. That is, it has created permanent additions to the supply of reserve balances that are some-
what less than the total need. Then on a seasonal and daily basis, the Desk is in a position to
add balances temporarily to get to the desired level." (see "Fedpoint: Open Market Operations",
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html).
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the asset market opens, eBi;t and fMi;t, in (4), household i0s asset market constraint reads
(Bi;t=Rt) +M
H
i;t + (R
m
t   1) Ii;t + Vtzi;t (6)
 Bi;t 1 +MHi;t 1 + (Vt + Pt%t) zi;t 1 + Ptwtni;t   Ptci;t   Pt t + Pt't:
while its i0s borrowing is restricted by zi;t  0, by MHi;t  0, and Bi;t  0 8t  0. The term
(Rmt   1) Ii;t measures the costs of money acquired in open market operations, because it
receives money Ii;t in exchange for Rmt Ii;t treasuries.
Maximizing (5) subject to the collateral constraint (2), the goods market constraint (3),
the asset market constraints (6) and the borrowing constraints, for given initial valuesMHi; 1,
Bi; 1, and zi; 1 leads to the following rst order conditions for working time, consumption,
additional money, as well as for holdings of government bonds, money, and equity:
 ui;nt=wt=i;t; (7)
ui;ct=i;t +  i;t; (8)
Rmt
 
i;t + i;t

=i;t +  i;t; (9)
Et
 
i;t+1 + i;t+1

 1t+1

=i;t=Rt; (10)
Et
 
i;t+1 +  i;t+1

 1t+1

=i;t; (11)
Et

i;t+1R
q
t+1
 1
t+1

=i;t; (12)
where Rqt = (Vt + Pt%t) =Vt 1 is the nominal rate of return on equity, and i;t, i;t and  i;t
denote the multiplier on the collateral, asset market, and goods market constraint. Finally,
the following complementary slackness conditions hold in the households optimum i:) 0 
bi;t 1 1t   Rmt ii;t, i;t  0, i;t
 
bi;t 1 1t  Rmt ii;t

= 0, and ii:) 0  ii;t +mHi;t 1 1t   ci;t,
 i;t  0,  i;t
 
ii;t +m
H
i;t 1
 1
t   ci;t

= 0, where mHi;t = M
H
i;t=Pt, bi;t = Bi;t=Pt, and ii;t =
Ii;t=Pt, as well as (6) with equality and associated transversality conditions.
The conditions (7) and (8) show that i;t > 0 and that a binding goods market constraint,
 i;t > 0, distorts the intratemporal consumption-leisure decision in a conventional way.
26
Condition (10) shows that a rise in the multiplier i;t, which measures the liquidity value
of treasuries, tends to lower the interest rate on treasuries Rt. Hence, a positive liquidity
value of treasuries i;t > 0 gives rise to a liquidity premium, between the treasury interest
and the rate of return on equity as can be seen from combining (10) and (12)
RtEt
 
i;t+1 + i;t+1

 1t+1

= Et

Reqt+1  i;t+1 1t+1

. (13)
26Combining (7) and (8) with (11), discloses the standard ination tax: Et [ui;ct+1=t+1] =  ui;nt=wt.
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The households investment decisions further relate the treasury rate to the policy rate.
It is willing to hold both assets, money and treasuries, if the rate of return on treasuries
compensates for the costs of acquiring new money in the next period. This can be seen by
combining (7), (9), (10), and (11) to
1=Rt =
Et
 
1=Rmt+1

(ui;ct+1=t+1)

Et [(ui;ct+1=t+1)]
; (14)
implying that the interest rate on treasuries equals the expected future policy rate up to
rst order in accordance with Simons (1990) evidence. Households are then willing to hold
both types of money, i.e. money held under repos MRi;t and outright M
H
i;t .
Firms There are perfectly competitive intermediate goods producing rms, which sell
their goods to monopolistically competitive retailers. The latter sell a di¤erentiated good
to bundlers who assemble nal goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology.
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producing rms indexed with j 2 [0; 1]. They
are perfectly competitive, owned by the households, and produce an identical intermediate
good with labor. Production depends on a stochastic productivity levels, which materialize
after the labor market closes. Firm j produces according to the production function
IOj;t = atn

j;t;  2 (0; 1); (15)
and sells the intermediate good to retailers at the price Pmt . The productivity level at
is generated by a stochastic process satisfying at = a
a
t 1 exp "a;t, where a  0, and "0a;ts
are normally and i.i.d. distributed with Et 1"a;t = 0 and a constant standard deviation
st:dev:("a)  0. Labor demand then satises
wt = mctatn
 1
j;t ; (16)
wheremct = Pmt =Pt denotes real marginal costs, and dividends are given by Pt%j;t = P
m
t (1 
)atn

j;t. Given that rms face the same prices, they behave in an identical way.
Monopolistically competitive retailers buy intermediate goods IOt =
R 1
0
IOj;tdj at the
common price Pmt . A retailer k 2 [0; 1] relabels the intermediate good to yk;t and sells
it at the price Pk;t to perfectly competitive bundlers, who bundle the goods yk;t to the
nal consumption good yt with the technology, y
" 1
"
t =
R 1
0
y
" 1
"
k;t dk, where " > 1. The cost
minimizing demand for yk;t is therefore given by yk;t = (Pk;t=Pt)
 " yt. Retailers set their
prices to maximize prots, where we consider a nominal rigidity in form of staggered price
setting as in Yun (1995). Each period a measure 1  of randomly selected retailers may reset
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their prices independently of the time elapsed since the last price setting, while a fraction
 2 [0; 1) of retailers do not adjust their prices. The fraction 1  of retailers set their price to
maximize the expected sum of discounted future prots, max ePk;t EtP1s=0 s't;t+s( ePk;tyk;t+s 
Pt+smct+syk;t+s), s.t. yk;t+s = ePk;t P t+syt+s. The rst order condition for their price ePk;t
is given by (where we use that Pmt =Pt are real marginal cost, mct) ~Zt =
"
" 1Z
1
t =Z
2
t , where
~Zt = ePk;t=Pt, Z1t = c t ytmct + Et"t+1Z1t+1 and Z2t = c t yt + Et" 1t+1Z2t+1. With
perfectly competitive bundlers and the homogenous bundling technology, the price index Pt
for the nal consumption good satises P 1 "t =
R 1
0
P 1 "k;t dk. Using the demand constraint,
we obtain 1 = (1  ) ~Z1 "t + " 1t .
Aggregate intermediate output is then given by IOt = nt , where nt =
R 1
0
nj;tdj, while
price dispersion across retailers a¤ects aggregate output. Specically, the market clearing
condition in the intermediate goods market, IOt =
R 1
0
yk;tdk; gives nt =
R 1
0
(Pk;t=Pt)
 " ytdk ,
yt = n

t =st, where st 
R 1
0
(Pk;t=Pt)
 " dk and st = (1  ) ~Z "t + st 1"t given s 1.
3.3 Public sector
Fiscal authority The government issues one-period nominally risk-free bonds BTt , which
are either held by households or the central bank. Throughout, we also refer to these bonds
as T-bills to emphasize that BTt consists of short-term treasuries that typically serve as
collateral in open market operations. To minimize interactions between scal policy and
monetary policies, which are beyond the scope of the analysis, we assume that the supply
of government bonds is exogenously determined. Specically, we consider a simple bond
supply regime that keeps the growth rate of T-bills constant,
BTt =  B
T
t 1; (17)
where   > . As mentioned above, (17) describes the supply of treasury securities that are
declared as eligible by the central bank, and is not aimed at modelling the evolution of total
public debt. The latter usually also contains debt with longer maturity that might grow
with a rate di¤erent from  , which will not be modelled here to keep the exposition simple.
In order to avoid any further e¤ects of scal policy, we assume that the government can
raise tax revenues in a non-distortionary way, Pt t. Accounting for transfers Ptmt from the
central bank, the government budget constraint is given by 
BTt =Rt

+ Pt
m
t + Pt t = B
T
t 1:
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As long as bonds with longer maturities are not eligible, they can be neglected without
any consequences for the analysis of monetary policy e¤ects. In fact, all qualitative results
derived in this paper will not be a¤ected either if we add non-eligible government bonds
with longer maturity or if we assume that only few of them are eligible.
Central bank The central bank supplies money in exchange for treasuries in open market
operations in form of outright sales/purchases MHt and repurchase agreements M
R
t . At the
beginning of each period, the central banks stock of treasuries equals Bct 1 and the stock of
outstanding money equals MHt 1. It then receives an amount B
c
t of treasuries in exchange
for money It, and after repurchase agreements are settled its holdings of treasuries reduces
by BRt and the amount of outstanding money by M
R
t = B
R
t . Before the asset market
opens, where the central bank can invest in new T-bills Bct , it holds an amount equal toeBct = Bct +Bct 1  BRt . Its budget constraint is given by
(Bct=Rt) + Pt
m
t = B
c
t +B
c
t 1  BRt +MHt  MHt 1  
 
It  MRt

:
In accordance with the operational practice of central banks, we assume that it rolls over
its maturing assets (see e.g. Meulendyke, 1998, Ch.7). For this, the central bank enters the
asset market at the end of each period and reinvests in treasuries to the amount that equals
its current stock of maturing assets Bct = eBct . Further using BRt =MRt andBct = Rmt It, the
budget constraint can be simplied to (Bct=Rt) Bct 1 = Rmt
 
MHt  MHt 1

+(Rmt   1)MRt  
Pt
m
t . Following common central bank practice, we assume that the central bank transfers
interest earnings to the government:
Pt
m
t = B
c
t (1  1=Rt) + (Rmt   1)MRt : (18)
Note that these transfers will not be negative in equilibrium, such that the central bank
will never rely on funds from the government.27 Accordingly, its holdings of treasuries will
evolve according to
Bct  Bct 1 = Rmt
 
MHt  MHt 1

: (19)
implying that it tends to hold more treasuries, when money supply or the policy rate are
high. Regarding the implementation of monetary policy, we assume that the central bank
conducts monetary policy by using a standard feedback rule for the current policy rate Rmt
27This is di¤erent in standard models, where central bank transfers seigniorage (dened as the change
in the monetary base) to the government in each period. A discussion of government transfers and central
bank independence can be found in Sims (2003).
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and by choosing an average policy rate Rm > 1:
Rmt =
 
Rmt 1
R (Rm)1 R (t=)(1 R)[(yt=y)=(eyt=ey)]y(1 R) exp "r;t; (20)
where Rm > 1, R  0,   0, and y  0, eyt denotes rst-best output, which is given byeyt = a 1+n1+n+( 1)t (=) 1+n+( 1) , and the "0r;ts are normally and i.i.d. with Et 1"r;t = 0. The
central bank further sets an ination target, which is consistent with the long-run ination
rate and satises  > . To avoid further complexities, we will assume that the growth
rate of T-bills   equals the central banks ination target,   = , which actually accords
to the estimated growth rate of T-bills (corrected by GDP growth) for the sample period
1966-2007 (see Section 5.1). The model can, however, easily be extended to allow for   6= 
(see Schabert, 2012).28
The central bank can further decide on whether money is traded in form of outright
sales/purchases or in form of repurchase agreements. For simplicity, we assume that it
exogenously sets the ratio of money supply under both types of open market operations

 :MRt = 
 MHt . We assume that 
 > 0 in accordance with the practice of the US Fed. In
fact, the Trading Desk of the New York Fedstructures its outright holdings to maintain a
need to routinely add to balances by arranging repurchase agreements(see Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 2006). The choice of 
 does not a¤ect the pattern but only the size of
monetary policy e¤ects, i.e. the size of the responses to an innovation to the policy rate.29
3.4 Rational expectations equilibrium
In equilibrium, there will be no arbitrage opportunities and markets clear, nt =
R 1
0
njtdj =R 1
0
nitdi and yt =
R 1
0
yjtdj =
R 1
0
citdi = ct. Aggregate asset holdings satisfy 8t  0 :
R
zi;tdi =
1, Bt =
R
Bi;tdi, MRt =
R 1
0
MRi;tdi, M
H
t =
R 1
0
MHi;tdi;
R
Ii;tdi = It = M
H
t  MHt 1 +MRt , and
BTt = Bt+B
c
t . Given that households (rms) behave in an identical way, we will omit indices
in the subsequent analysis. In a rational expectations (REE) all plans and constraints of
households and rms are satised and consistent with monetary and scal policy, for given
initial endowments (see denition 1 in Appendix A.1).
28If the central bank would adjust the amount of eligible treasuries, it can chose an ination target that
di¤ers from  . When, for example, the central bank chooses for a smaller ination target  <  , it might
accept smaller fractions of treasuries in open market operations. Otherwise, for  >  , it might also declare
other assets (or a fraction of them) as eligible, which grow with a rate that exceeds  .
29In fact, a higher ratio of money supplied under repurchase agreements relative to money supplied
outright increases the e¤ectiveness of changes in the policy rate, which provides a rationale why central
banks create a structural deciency with respect to the outright supply of money, like the Fed (see
Fedpoint: Open Market Operations, http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html).
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The main di¤erence to a standard New Keynesian model is the existence of the collateral
constraint in open market operations (2), which restricts householdsaccess to money. The
model reduces to a conventional sticky price model if the collateral constraint,
MHt  MHt 1 +MRt  Bt 1=Rmt ; (21)
is slack, i.e. if the multiplier t equals zero (see denition 2 in Appendix A.1). In this case,
there is no liquidity premium on eligible securities, such that the expected equity return
equals the treasury rate up to rst order (see 13). Throughout the subsequent analysis, we
are interested in the case where the collateral constraint (21) is binding. To see when this is
the case, eliminate i;t and  i;t in (9) by (8) and (11), which leads to
i;t
ui;ct
= 1
Rmt
 Et ui;ct+1ui;ctt+1
that can in equilibrium be written as
t=uc;t = (1=R
m
t )  (1=REulert )  0; (22)
where REulert is the standard Euler rate dened as 1=R
Euler
t = Et
uc;t+1
uc;tt+1
(as in Section
2). As it is well-known, the nominal Euler rate measures the marginal valuation of money.
Agents are willing to spend a price REulert   1 to transform one unit of an illiquid asset,
i.e. an asset that is not accepted as a means of payment today and delivers one unit of
money tomorrow, into one unit of money today. Hence, if the central bank supplies money
at a lower price Rmt < R
Euler
t , households earn a positive rent and are willing to get the
maximum amount of money they can get. Given that this amount is restricted by holdings
of eligible assets, the collateral constraint (21) will then be binding, indicating a positive
liquidity value of treasuries, t > 0. A binding collateral constraint (21), which relies on a
positive valuation of liquidity, implies the cash constraint (3) to be binding as well,  t > 0.
30
If the central bank would supply money at the rate Rmt in an unrestricted way (e.g. by
accepting securities that can be issued by private sector agents in an unbounded way), then
households will adjust their consumption pattern until their marginal valuation of money
equals the price, i.e. REulert = R
m
t . This accords to the case typically considered in standard
macroeconomic models, where the policy rate a¤ects aggregate demand via the consumption
Euler equation and there is no liquidity premium on treasuries (see Appendix A.1).
30To see this, combine (8) and (11), which leads to c i;t = Et
c i;t+1
t+1
+ i;t. Hence, the multiplier  t on the
goods market constraint (3) satises  t=uc;t = 1   (1=REulert )  0 in equilibrium, which obviously implies
 t > 0 if 1  Rmt < REulert .
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4 Analytical results
In this Section, we analytically examine some main properties of the model. In particular,
we show how the liquidity premium is a¤ected by the bills-to-gdp ratio and by monetary
policy. For this, we apply several parameter values that simplify the model. We assume
that utility is logarithmic in consumption ( = 1) and that money is only supplied via
repos (
 ! 1). The latter assumption implies that T-bills are only held by the private
sector, Bt = BTt . We further assume that the central bank sets the policy rate exogenously,
i.e. y =  = 0 (see 20), and the ination target at  = 1. It should be noted that the
equilibrium is uniquely determined under an exogenous policy rate.31 Appendix A.2 pro-
vides an equilibrium determinacy analysis, which shows that the model exhibits equilibrium
determinacy under a large set of reasonable feedback coe¢ cients (see lemma 1). For the
quantitative analysis in Section 5, we consider a more realistic monetary policy and apply
an endogenous policy rate rule, which satises the Taylor-principle.
Euler rate versus policy rate We rst examine how the spread between the Euler
rate REulert and the policy rate R
m
t is related to monetary policy and the bills-to-gdp ratio.
Throughout the following analysis, we restrict our attention to the case where the central
bank sets the policy rate below the equilibrium Euler rate. As implied by (22), the collateral
constraint (21) is binding in this case. For perfectly exible prices,  = 0, it can be shown
that this can be guaranteed by the central bank if it sets the policy rate in a way that its
expected value EtRmt+1 is below the long-run Euler rate, which equals = as usual. The
spread Euler sEulert = R
Euler
t   Rmt , which proxies the liquidity premium on treasuries as
the treasury rate, closely follows the expected policy rate (see 14), can further be shown to
be negatively related the expected policy rate and to the expected bills-to-gdp ratio. These
properties are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the case of exible prices,  = 0, with 
!1,  = 1, and   = 1.
If the central bank sets the policy rate and the ination target according to EtRmt+1 < =
and  > , the collateral constraint (21) is binding in equilibrium. The Euler spread sEulert
is then negatively related to the expected policy rate and to the expected bills-to-gdp ratio.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
31The reason why local equilibrium determinacy does not depend on the Taylor-principle is that the stock
of eligible securities serves as a nominal anchor (like under a money growth policy). This closely relates to
the determinacy property of Adao et al.s (2003) cash-in-advance model with sticky prices, where both, the
nominal interest rate and the supply of money, are controlled by the central bank at the same time.
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By setting the policy rate, the central bank decides on whether the collateral constraint is
binding or not. Under a binding collateral constraint, the supply of money is bounded and
the householdsconsumption choice is restricted by the available amount of collateral. The
associated optimal consumption growth rate as well as the expected ination rate determine
the willingness to pay for an extra unit of money, i.e. the Euler rate. The central bank
can set the price of money in open market operations below the Euler rate to support this
equilibrium. If, in contrast, it sets the policy rate equal to the Euler rate Rmt = R
Euler
t ,
there is no liquidity premium, since the price of money equals the householdsmarginal
willingness to pay for cash, implying that the collateral constraint is slack.
Proposition 1 further shows that the ratio of the Euler rate to the policy rate is negatively
related to the expected policy rate and the expected bills-to-gdp ratio in the simplied model.
Here, a binding collateral constraint, mRt = bt=R
m
t and a binding cash constraint, yt = m
R
t ,
directly equate the policy rate and the bills-to-gdp rate. Hence, both negative correlations
are due to the property that the Euler rate moves less than one for one with the policy rate.
In the subsequent analysis, we will show that the model generates negative correlations of
the liquidity premium with the bills-to-gdp ratio and the policy rate which are consistent
with the empirical evidence provided in Section 2.
Monetary policy e¤ects Under a binding collateral constraint, the models monetary
transmission mechanism di¤ers from the well known logic of New Keynesian models, since
the (real) policy rate does not directly govern consumption growth according to the standard
Euler equation. For a given beginning-of-period nominal stock of eligible assets, a higher
policy rate (i.e. an increase in the price of money in terms of eligible assets) tends to reduce
the amount of money that can be acquired via repos. Hence, an increase in the policy rate
exerts a contractionary e¤ect on nominal expenditures by making money more expensive.
To examine the monetary policy e¤ects, we consider both cases of exible and sticky
prices separately. For the exible price case, we extend the analysis on which Proposition 1
is based upon. For the sticky price case, we apply a local approximation to the model at a
steady state with a binding collateral constraint, which requires the central bank to set its
policy rate target Rm at a value smaller than = (see also Proposition 1). We then solve
the set of equilibrium conditions, which are log-linearized at this steady state. To derive the
unique solution under sticky prices, we apply the local determinacy conditions of the model.
This analysis, which is summarized in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.2, shows that an exogenous
policy rate,  = y = 0, is associated with equilibrium determinacy. For both cases, we
restrict changes in the policy rate to be su¢ ciently small such that EtRmt+1 < =. The
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following proposition summarizes the e¤ects of monetary policy for exible prices,  = 0,
and sticky prices,  > 0.
Proposition 2 Consider a simplied version of the model with   0, 
!1,  = 1; and
a monetary policy satisfying (20) with  = y = 0, R > 1=2, EtR
m
t+1 < =, and  = 1.
1. A rise in the policy rate leads on impact to a fall in output and ination and to a rise
in the Euler rate.
2. The spread sEulert decreases with the policy rate, is negatively related to the bills-to-gdp
ratio, and is more volatile than the (net) Euler rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
As summarized by Proposition 2, the qualitative properties of monetary policy e¤ects ac-
cord to conventional expectations (e.g. a higher policy rate lowers output and ination) and
do not depend on the degree of price exibility. In both cases, the Euler rate increases with
the policy rate by less than one for one such that the spread sEulert decreases in response to
a policy rate increase. The simple reason is that the liquidity value of treasuries is immedi-
ately reduced when the policy rate rises, since the price of money in terms of treasuries in
open market operations increases (which requires more treasuries for a particular amount of
money). At the same time, the willingness to transfer means of payment to the future falls,
implying a rise in the Euler rate. Given that the increase in the latter is less pronounced
than the rise in the policy rate, the spread between both rates falls.
Hence, the liquidity premium on treasuries, which originates in their convertibility into
means of payments in open market operations, falls if the price of money in terms of trea-
suries Rmt increases. Likewise, the liquidity premium falls when more eligible assets are
available, i.e. when the bills-to-gdp ratio bt=yt increases. Given that money is only supplied
via repos, all T-bills are held the private sector, such that bt=yt = bTt =yt. This will not be
the case in the calibrated version, which will be examined in the subsequent section. To
summarize, the spread between the Euler rate and the policy rate is negatively related to
the policy rate itself and to the bills-to-gdp ratio, which is consistent with the empirical
evidence provided in Section 2. Moreover, the observation that the Euler spread sEulert is
more volatile than the (net) Euler rate REulert   1 (see Section 2.2 or Chari et al., 2009) is
also implied by the model (see part 2 of Proposition 2).32
32For the case of exible prices it can further be shown that a higher variance of the policy rate reduces
the liquidity premium as well (see proof of proposition 2), since the liquidity value of bonds for open market
operations becomes more uncertain. Put di¤erently, when the costs associated with the liquidation of bonds
get more uncertain, the compensating interest rate increases. This e¤ect accords to the idea of a liquidity
risk premium (see also Acharya and Pedersen, 2005).
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5 Quantitative analysis
In this Section, we present a quantitative analysis of a calibrated version of the model. In
the rst part of this Section, we describe how the model is extended and calibrated. The
moments of simulated series are compared with the corresponding empirical moments of
Section 2, which do not serve as targets for the model calibration. We then demonstrate
that the model is able to generate macroeconomic e¤ects of monetary policy shocks, which
are consistent with broad empirical (VAR) evidence. In the last part of this Section, we
assess the robustness of the results by applying an alternative money demand specication.
5.1 Model extension and calibration
For the quantitative analysis of the model, we follow the literature on quantitative New
Keynesian models (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007) and allow for habit formation as
well as for accumulation of productive physical capital with investment adjustment costs.
Specically, we allow for external habits by assuming that household utility is given by:
u (ci;t; ni;t) = [(ci;t hct 1)1 = (1  ) 1] n1+ni;t =(1+n), where h  0. We further assume
that the stock of capital kt contributes to the production of intermediate goods according
to a neoclassical production function, IOj;t = atnj;tk
1 
j;t 1; where  2 (0; 1), which replaces
(15). The accumulation of physical capital is associated with adjustment costs: kj;t =
(1  ) kj;t 1+xj;tG (xj;t=xj;t 1), where xj;t denotes investment expenditures and investment
adjustment costs are G (xj;t=xj;t 1) = 1    12 (xj;t=xj;t 1   1)2 with G (1) = G0 (1) = 0 and
G00(1) =  > 0. Intermediate goods producing rms are  like households assumed to
rely on cash Lj;t for goods market purchases. They borrow cash from households at the
price 1=RLt and pay back the loan after goods are sold, such that rm j faces the constraint
Lj;t=R
L
t  Ptxj;t. Household is goods market constraint (3) then changes to Ptci;t  Ii;t +
MHi;t 1 Li;t=RLt , implying that the demanded loan rate equals the Euler rate, RLt = REulert .33
The problem of a rm j can then be summarized as maxEt
P1
k=0 
k uc;t+k
uc;t
%j;t+k, where real
dividends are now given by %j;t = (Zt=Pt)atn

j;tk
1 
t 1  wtnj;t xj;t (1 1=RLt )Lj;t=Pt, subject
to capital accumulation and the rms cash constraint. The former gives rise to the price qt
of physical capital in terms of the nal good and the latter distorts the investment decision
if RLt > 1. The full set of equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix A.3.
For most of the parameters we apply standard values, which accord to an interpretation
33Using that its budget constraint (6) further contains interest earnings from intraperiod loans (1  
1=RLt )Li;t, the rst order condition for the supply of loans is i;t = (i;t+ i;t)=R
L
t , which can be combined
with (8) and (11) to get 1=RLt = Et
uc;t+1
uc;tt+1
.
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of a period as a quarter (see Appendix B.1 for an overview). We adopt Christiano et
al.s (2005) choice of non-estimated parameters and set the inverses of the elasticities of
intertemporal substitution at  = 1 and n = 1, the labor income share at  = 2=3, and
the depreciation rate at  = 0:025. For the fraction of non-optimally price adjusting rms
, and the elasticity of substitution  we chose the values  = 0:8 and  = 13, and the
utility parameter  is chosen to lead to a steady state working time of n = 1=3. While the
investment adjustment cost parameter  is typically identied by model estimates based on
aggregate data (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005, or Smets and Wouters, 2007), we apply a
benchmark value of  = 0:065 that accords to Groth and Khans (2010) estimates based on
disaggregate data, which is much smaller than typical estimates based on aggregate data
(e.g.  = 2:48, see Christiano et al., 2005). For a sensitivity analysis, we vary the values of
the cost parameter  and of the habit parameter h, for which we apply a benchmark value
of 0:7 (see Smets and Wouters, 2007).
For the policy rate, which is identied with the Federal Funds rate, we set the average
value Rm equal to the sample mean of the Federal Funds rate for the sample 1966-2007:
Rm = 1:0651=4. The ination target is set equal to the mean ination rate of the same
sample period,  = 1:0461=4.34 The central bank sets the policy rate according to the
feedback rule (20), where the output gap is measured by deviations from the rst best
value eyt (see Appendix A.3). For the policy rule coe¢ cients we apply Mehra and Mintons
(2007) estimates, which accord to standard values: R = 0:73,  = 1:5, y = 0:78
1=4, and
sd("R) = 0:003. For choice of the discount factor , we can further use that the models
predictions can be compared to observable spreads, like the corporate bond yield spread
RLt  Rt or the spread between the rate of return on equity and the treasury rate Rqt  Rt.
We decided to set  at an intermediate value,  = 0:993, which implies that the steady
state spread RL   R equals 0:0025 (where we used RL = REuler = = and R = Rm),
or 100 basis points for annualized rates, which accords to the corporate bond yield spread
in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).35 It further implies an equity premium
E0(R
q
t   Rt) of 2:32% per annum (based on a second-order approximation of the model),
which is 2-3 times smaller than typically estimated for US data. We estimate the growth
rate   of T-bills (see 17) using data for the total stock of T-bills for 1966-2007 from the U.S.
Treasury. The estimated value equals   = 7:2%, which almost exactly equals the growth
rate of nominal GDP, implying that we can set   equal to the ination target,   = . We
34Data for the Federal Funds rate and the ination rate are taken from FRED database.
35The paper-bill spread applied in Section 2, which has been choosen for the empirical analysis to isolate
a pure liquidity premium, is in fact smaller.
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further set the policy parameter 
 equal to 12 to match the maximum output response to
monetary policy shocks (i.e. an increase in output by 0.25% in deviations from its steady
state value in response to an increase of the policy rate by 30 b:p:) as identied in the VAR of
Section 2.2. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the AR1-process for total factor productivity
(TFP) is set equal to 0:8, while the standard deviation of its innovations "a is calibrated
to match the observed standard deviation of the hp-ltered GDP series for 1966-2007, i.e.
st:dev:((yt   y) =y) = 1:53, leading to sd("a) = 0:0173.
5.2 Selected moments
In this Section, we examine selected moments of interest rates and spreads, which correspond
to the moments presented in Table 1 in Section 2. Specically, we consider the liquidity
premium st = REulert  Rmt , which has been estimated in Section 2.1, and the spread between
corporate and government bonds sTreast = R
L
t   Rt, whose empirical counterpart has been
discussed in Section 2.2. Note that the latter spread sTreast closely relates to s
Euler
t , since
the borrowing rate of rms RLt equals the Euler rate, R
L
t = R
Euler
t , and the treasury rate
Rt equals the expected policy rate up to rst order (see 14): Rt  EtRmt+1, which accords
to empirical evidence provided by Simon (1990). Table 2 presents correlations between
interest rates and the spreads with the bills-to-gdp ratio and with the policy rate, and
relative standard deviations. To facilitate comparisons with the empirical results in section
2, we focus on the model version without habits (h = 0). The rst column presents the
empirical moments (see Table 1), for convenience. The following three columns refer to a
model specication without habits (h = 0), the next column presents moments of simulated
series with external habits (h = 0:7), and the last column refers to an alternative model
version (see Section 5.4).
The correlation between the treasury spread sTreast and the ratio of T-bills (held by
private agents) to gdp bt 1=yt that is computed from simulated series exhibits the same
sign as its empirical counterpart. The correlation for the version with habits comes closest
but is still substantially larger than found empirically, which is mainly due to the sim-
ple cash-in-advance specication of money demand (see section 5.4).36 The correlation
between the treasury rate and the policy rate almost equals unity, as in the data. The
correlations between the Euler rate and the policy rate corr
 
REulert ; R
m
t

as well as the
correlation between the Euler spread and the policy rate corr(sEulert ; R
m
t ) exhibit the same
signs and similar magnitudes as their empirical counterparts. The former, corr
 
REulert ; R
m
t

,
36These correlations are slighly smaller when private sector holdings of treasuries Bt instead of their total
stock BTt are taken into account.
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Table 2: Unconditional moments of selected series
Data W/o Habits h=0 Habits h=0.7 MIU
PR & TFP PR TFP PR & TFP PR & TFP
corr
 
sTreast ; bt 1=yt
  0:62  0:92  0:90  0:99  0:86  0:36
corr (Rt; R
m
t ) 0:99 0:98 0:99 0:98 0:98 0:99
corr
 
REulert ; R
m
t

0:53 0:71 0:58 0:79 0:66 0:68
corr(sEulert ; R
m
t )  0:82  0:95  0:99  0:52  0:90  0:99
sd(sEulert )=sd(R
m
t ) 0:85 0:79 0:95 0:71 0:78 0:93
sd(sEulert )=sd(R
Euler
t ) 1:49 2:19 7:6 1:68 1:75 8:6
Note: Standard deviations refer to net interest rates and the abbreviations PR, TFP, and MIU denote policy
rate shocks, technology shocks, and a money-in-the-utility-function versions with habits.
is overestimated by the model, which is mainly driven by technology shocks. The latter,
corr(sEulert ; R
m
t ), is highly negative when only interest rate shocks are considered, and it is
less pronounced when only technology shocks are considered. Under both types of shocks,
it is still somewhat larger than its empirical counterpart. Regarding the relative volatilities,
Table 2 shows that the Euler spread sEulert exhibits a smaller standard deviation than the
policy rate, whereas it is more volatile than the Euler rate. The magnitudes of the rela-
tive standard deviations are similar to their empirical counterparts when both shocks are
present, while the spread is much more volatile than the Euler rate when only policy shocks
are considered. Overall, the model is able to reasonably replicate the empirical moments of
interest rates and spreads. Notably, the moments of simulated series are not substantially
altered when habits are taken into account.
5.3 Monetary transmission
In this Section, we show that responses to policy rate shocks accord to broad empirical
evidence,37 even though the transmission mechanism di¤ers from monetary transmission in
standard New Keynesian models, where the real policy rate equals the rate of intertemporal
substitution. Figure 1 presents the impulse responses of interest rates and macroeconomic
aggregates to a one standard deviation innovation to the policy rate, "r;t > 0 (see 20). Note
that interest rates, the ination rate, and the bills-to-gdp ratio are presented as absolute
deviations from their steady state values, while output, consumption, and investments are
presented in percentage deviations from their steady state values, e.g. byt = 100  (yt  y)=y.
The black solid line shows the impulse responses of the version of the model with habits,
37Impulse responses a technology shocks can be found in Appendix B.2.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to policy rate shocks
h = 0:7, and investment adjustment costs with  = 0:065. To illustrate that monetary
transmission is not based on controlling the rate of intertemporal substitution, we consider
two additional versions: The red solid circled line presents impulse responses without habits
(h = 0) and the blue dashed line with diamonds presents impulse responses with investment
adjustment costs that are 10 times larger than in the benchmark case ( = 0:65).
An increase of the policy rate from its steady state value leads to a smaller rise in the
treasury rate Rt, since it follows the future expected policy rate (see 14). Output and
ination decrease, which imply together with the supply of T-bills (17) that the bills-
to-gdp ratio bt 1=yt increases with the policy rate. Notably, these responses are virtually
not a¤ected by habit formation or investment adjustment costs. The Euler rate rises on
impact and returns back to its steady state value from below. This behavior is reected by
the response of consumption, which grows after it falls on impact. Omitting habits (see red
solid circled line), leads to a more pronounced impact e¤ect on consumption and slightly
reduced Euler rate response. When investment adjustment costs are raised by the factor
10 (see blue dashed line with diamonds), the maximum investment response is reduced by
40%, which is compensated by a more pronounced consumption response. Accordingly, the
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initial increase in the Euler rate is 7 times larger (not displayed) than in the benchmark
case. These experiments show that habits and investment adjustment costs mainly alter
the composition of aggregate demand, implying that the output and ination e¤ects of
monetary policy are not primarily governed by intertemporal substitution e¤ects. It should
be noted that the insensitivity of the output response is mainly due to the money demand
specication, which implies that aggregate demand is restricted by ct + xt  mHt +mRt in
equilibrium.
In this model, a higher policy rate predominantly impacts on the level of consumption
and investments due to the increased price of money in open market operations and the
binding cash and collateral constraints. In contrast, in a standard model, where the policy
rate equals the Euler rate, a higher (real) policy rate immediately increases the growth rate
of consumption via the consumption Euler equation. Here, part of an increase in the policy
rate is reected by a decrease in liquidity premium (see 10) such that consumption growth is
not one-for-one a¤ected by the real policy rate. Likewise, the latter does not directly impact
on the rate of return on investments, such that the investment response is less pronounced
for a given magnitude of investment adjustment costs than in a standard model.38
5.4 Alternative money demand specication
In this Section, we consider an alternative money demand specication to assess the robust-
ness of our main results. To provide a transparent motivation for the demand for liquid
assets, we imposed a cash constraint for consumption expenditures (3) in the previous
analysis, while we added a cash constraint for rms to treat investment and consumption
expenditures in a symmetric way. Given that these cash constraints are rather rigid and
imply an unrealistic velocity, we apply a widely used money-in-the-utility function specica-
tion. Instead of considering cash constraints, we follow Christiano et al. (2005) and assume
that real balances enter household i0s utility function in a separable way:
u (ci;t;Mi;t=Pt; ni;t) =
(ci;t   hci;t 1)1 
1     
n1+ni;t
1 + n
+ 
(Mi;t=Pt)
1 m
1  m ; (23)
where m  1,  > 0, and Mi;t = Ii;t +MHi;t 1, while access to money is still constrained
by (2). Household i0s demand for additional money and holdings of money then satises
(Rmt   1)i;t+Rmt i;t = ui;mt and Et (ui;m;t+1=t+1) =
 
REulert   1

=REulert

ui;ct instead of
38Note that a magnitude of investment adjustment costs that is obtained from estimates based on ag-
gregate data, e.g.  = 5:88 in Smets and Wouters (2007), is much larger and would lead to an investment
response that is smaller than the output response, which is clearly at odds with VAR evidence (see, e.g.
Christiano et al., 2005).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to policy rate shocks for an alternative money demand
(9) and (10),39 where the Euler rate measures the opportunity costs of holding money from
one period to the other (see discussion in Section 3.4). Like households, rms are assumed
not to rely on cash for goods purchases, such that the set of equilibrium conditions (given
in denition 5 in Appendix A.3) changes by t = uc;t, Et[
 
mHt+1 +m
R
t+1
 m
=t+1] =
(1 1=REulert )uc;t, nnt = uc;tmctyt=nt; 1 = qt[Gt+ xtxt 1G0t] Et(
t+1
t
qt+1(
xt+1
xt
)2G0t+1), and
%t = yt   wtnt   xt, which replace (61), (62), (64), (65) and (67). The parameters  and
m in (23) are calibrated to get a velocity y=m of 0:44 (see Christiano et al., 2005) and to
replicate the impact output e¤ect of policy rate shocks for the benchmark parametrization
( = 14 and m = 6:5). The standard deviation of the productivity shock is again adjusted
to match the observed standard deviation of detrended output (st:dev:("a) = 0:0064), while
the remaining parameter values are unchanged.
When money demand is induced by a money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) specication,
the qualitative results with regard to interest rates and spreads are unchanged. Like be-
39In the steady state, the multiplier on collateral constraint now satises =uc = REuler[(1=Rm)  
(1=REuler)], such that REuler > Rm again implies a binding collateral constraint.
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fore, we compute selected moments of simulated time series taking both shocks, i.e. policy
rate shocks and technology shocks, into account. The last column in Table 2 shows that
all correlations exhibit the same sign and similar magnitudes as their empirical counter-
parts, though the negative correlation between the spread st and the policy rate is more
pronounced. The standard deviation of the Euler spread again lies between the standard
deviation of the Euler rate and the policy rate, while the latter ratio is almost four times
larger than in the benchmark model. The impulse responses to an innovation to the policy
rate are presented in Figure 2 (responses to productivity shocks are shown in Appendix
B.2). They are consistent with previous results and broadly show the same pattern as the
benchmark model (see 1). Given that money demand is less restrictive, aggregate demand
and ination are now a¤ected by habit formation and investment adjustment costs in an
intuitive way, while response of the Euler rate is virtually unchanged.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a simple macroeconomic model where the rate of return on short-
term treasuries is endogenously linked to the monetary policy rate and tends to be smaller
than the rates on corporate borrowing, consistent with broad empirical evidence. We intro-
duce monetary policy implementation via open market operations into a standard macro-
economic model, which gives rise to a liquidity premium on eligible assets, i.e. short-term
treasuries, compared to non-eligible assets. The model predicts that this liquidity premium
is negatively related to the ratio of bills to GDP, which accords to empirical evidence. While
standard macroeconomic models typically assume that the (real) policy rate equals the rate
of intertemporal substitution, we show that they di¤er and that the spread also known as
the Euler equation error is negatively related to the policy rate and more volatile that the
consumption Euler rate, which has been reported in several studies.
Although the existence of a liquidity premium substantially alters the monetary trans-
mission mechanism, compared to a standard New Keynesian model for example, responses
of real activity and ination to monetary policy shocks are consistent with broad empirical
evidence. Hence, the framework can be extended to medium-scale or large-scale models
that can reasonably be estimated without neglecting the implementation of monetary poli-
cies beyond controlling the policy rate, which particularly regained interest during and in
the aftermath of the recent nancial crisis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium conditions
Denition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a set of sequences fct; nt; yt;
wt; m
R
t ; m
H
t ; mct; %t, vt, R
q
t , R
Euler
t ; Rt; bt; b
T
t , t; ~Zt; stg1t=0 satisfying
ct = m
H
t +m
R
t , if R
Euler
t > 1; (24)
or ct  mHt +mRt , if REulert = 1;
bt 1= (Rmt t) = m
H
t  mHt 1 1t +mRt , if REulert > Rmt ; (25)
or bt 1= (Rmt t)  mHt  mHt 1 1t +mRt , if REulert = Rmt ;
mRt = 
m
H
t ; (26)
nnt = uc;twt=R
Euler
t ; (27)
wt = mctyt=nt; (28)
1=REulert = Et [uc;t+1= (uc;tt+1)] ; (29)
Etuc;t+1
 1
t+1 = RtEt
 
Rmt+1
 1
uc;t
 1
t+1; (30)
~Zt ("  1) =" = Z1t =Z2t ; (31)
1 = (1  )( ~Zt)1 " + " 1t ; (32)
st = (1  ) ~Z "t + st 1"t ; (33)
yt = atn

t =st; (34)
yt = ct; (35)
bt   bt 1 1t = (   1)bTt 1 1t  Rmt
 
mHt  mHt 1 1t

, (36)
bTt =  b
T
t 1=t; (37)
Rqt = Pt (vt + %t) = (Pt 1vt 1) ; (38)
1 = Et

(t+1=t) 
 
Rqt+1=t+1

; (39)
%t = mct (yt   wtnt) ; (40)
(where uc;t = c t , Z
1
t = tytmct + Et
"
t+1Z
1
t+1, Z
2
t = tyt + Et
" 1
t+1Z
2
t+1; t =
Et [uc;t+1=t+1], and eyt = a 1+n1+n+( 1)t (=) 1+n+( 1) ) the transversality conditions, for
a monetary policy setting fRmt  1g1t=0 according to (20), 
t > 0, and   , given se-
quences fat; "r;tg1t=0 and initial values mH 1 > 0, b 1 > 0, bT 1 > 0, and s 1  1:
If the collateral constraint is not binding, which would be the case when the policy rate
equals the Euler rate, Rmt = R
Euler
t , the model can be reduced to a standard sticky price
model with a cash-credit good distortion, where Ricardian equivalence holds:
Denition 2 Under a non-binding collateral constraint, a REE to a set of equilibrium
sequences for fct; nt; yt; wt;mct; t; st; ~Ztg1t=0 given by (28), nnt = uc;twt=Rmt ; 1=Rmt =
Et [uc;t+1= (uc;tt+1)] ; (where uc;t = c t ) (31)-(35), for a monetary policy setting fRmt 
1g1t=0 according to (20),   , given sequences fat; "r;tg1t=0 and an initial value s 1  1:
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A.2 Appendix to section 4
In this Appendix, we rst dene a REE under exible prices for the simplied version,
before we prove the claims made in proposition 1. Then, we examine the local determinacy
properties under sticky prices, which will be used for the subsequent proof of proposition 2.
Denition 3 For  = 0, 
!1,  = 1, and   =  = 1, a REE is a set of sequences fct,
nt, yt, wt;mRt , t, R
Euler
t , btg1t=0 and P0 > 0 satisfying (27)-(29), (35),
ct = m
R
t , if R
Euler
t > 1; or ct  mRt , if REulert = 1; (41)
bt 1= (Rmt t) = m
R
t , if R
Euler
t > R
m
t ; or bt 1= (R
m
t t)  mRt , if REulert = Rmt ; (42)
bt = bt 1 1t ; (43)
yt = atn

t ; (44)
where mct = ("   1)=", the transversality conditions, for a monetary policy setting fRmt 
1g1t=0 according to (20), 
t > 0, and   , given sequence fat; "r;tg1t=0 and an initial value
b 1 > 0:
Proof of proposition 1. Consider the model summarized in denition 3. Combining
(27), (28), (35), and (44) leads to yt = at

(mc=)
 
1=REulert
=(1+n), such that a REE
can be reduced to a set of sequences fyt, t, REulert , btg1t=0 and P0 > 0 satisfying
yt = at

(=)
 
1=REulert
=(1+n)
; (45)
1=REulert = ytEt[1=(yt+1t+1)]; (46)
yt = bt 1= (Rmt t) , if R
Euler
t > R
m
t ; or yt  bt 1= (Rmt t) , if REulert = Rmt ; (47)
bt = bt 1 1t 8t  1, (48)
and P0b0 = B 1, where  = " 1"  < 1, for a monetary policy setting R
m
t for a given initial
stock of treasuries B 1 > 0. Consider the case where the constraint (47) is binding, which
requires REulert > R
m
t to hold in equilibrium according to (22). Eliminating output in (46)
with (47) for REulert > R
m
t , gives 1=R
Euler
t = bt 1(btR
m
t t)
 1EtRmt+1, and substituting out
bonds by (48) leads to
1=REulert = (=)EtR
m
t+1=R
m
t (49)
, REulert =Rmt = (=)
 
1=EtR
m
t+1

. The latter implies that if EtRmt+1 < =, the Euler
rate exceeds the policy rate, REulert > R
m
t , which is consistent with a binding collateral
constraint, and that the spread REulert =R
m
t decreases with the expected policy rate. It
further immediately follows from (47) and (48) that the policy rate is positively related
to the bills-to-gdp ratio, Rmt = (bt=yt)
 1 , such that the spread REulert =R
m
t is negatively
related to the expected bills-to-gdp ratio REulert =R
m
t = (=) [=Et (bt+1=yt+1)].
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Under sticky prices,  > 0, and for 
 ! 1 and   =  = 1, the model can be reduced
to a set of sequences fct, nt, yt, wt;mRt , t, REulert , bt; mct, Zt, stg1t=0 and P0 > 0 satisfying
(27)-(29), (31)-(35), (41)-(43), the transversality conditions, for a monetary policy setting
fRmt  1g1t=0, 
t > 0, and  > , given a sequence fatg1t=0 and initial values b 1 > 0 and
s 1  1. Suppose that the average policy rate and the ination target satisfy Rm < =
and  >  ) REuler > 1, where steady state values exhibit not time index. Then, the
collateral constraint is binding in the steady state. Log-linearizing the model at this steady
state and assuming that shocks are su¢ ciently small such that the economy remains in the
neighborhood of the steady state, we can dene a RE equilibrium as follows. Note that bxt
denotes log-deviation from the steady state value bxt = log xt=x.
Denition 4 For 
 ! 1,   =  = 1, Rm 2 [1; 1=), a REE is a set of convergent
sequences fbyt; t, bbt, R^Eulert ; R^mt g1t=0 satisfying
byt = bbt 1   bt   R^mt ; (50)
byt = Etbyt+1   R^Eulert + Etbt+1; (51)bt = Etbt+1 +  ($   1) byt    (1 + n) 1bat + R^Eulert ; (52)bbt = bbt 1   bt; (53)bRmt = R bRmt 1 + (1  R)bt + y(1  R) (byt   &bat) + "r;t; (54)
where $ = 1+n

+  > 1,  = (1  )(1  )=, and & = 1+n
1+n+( 1) , given b 1 > 0.
The following lemma describes local determinacy for the REE given in denition 4.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the central bank sets the policy rate according to (20) with R = 0.
The REE as given in denition 4 is uniquely determined if
( + 1=2)

(1 + n)
 1   (1 + ) >    1 + y (1 +  + ) 1; (55)
Proof. Consider the model given in denition 4, which can by eliminating the Euler rate
with (51) be further reduced to (50), (53), and
bt = ( + )Etbt+1 +  ($   1  ) byt + Etbyt+1: (56)
Abstracting from shocks, at = 1 and "r;t = 0, for simplicity, and using the policy rulecRtm =
bt+ybyt, condition (50) implies byt = 11+ybbt 1  1+1+y bt. Substituting out output with the
latter, (56) can together with (53) be written as [( + )  1+
1+y
]Etbt+1+ ($ 1)1+y bbt = bt[1+
 ($   1  ) 
1+y
]. Hence, the model can be reduced to a two-dimensional system in bbt andbt, which exhibits the characteristic polynomial F (X) = X2   21 + 31 + 1X + 31 , where
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1 = ( + )  1+1+y , 2 =
($ 1)
1+y
> 0; 3 = 1+ ($   1  ) 1+y > 0, and 4 =
($ 1 )
1+y
.
Hence, F (0) = 3
1
and F (1) =   2
1
, implying signF (0) =  signF (1), and there exists at
least one real stable eigenvalue between zero and one. Further, F (X) at X =  1 is given
by F ( 1)1=2 = ( + 1 + ) +  (1=2)+1+y [
1+n

  (1 + ))]. For F ( 1)1=2 > 0, such that
signF (0) =signF ( 1), there exists exactly one stable eigenvalue, between zero and one, and
one unstable eigenvalue, indicating local determinacy. Hence, the equilibrium is uniquely
determined if (55) is satised.
Condition (55) is hardly restrictive for a reasonable choice of parameter values. If, for
example, the Frisch labor supply elasticity is not too small, i.e. n >  (1 + )   1, (55)
is always satised. The following proof examines the simplied version for exible prices
and for sticky prices, where (55) is satised and determinacy is guaranteed by  = 1 and
;y = 0.
Proof of proposition 2. Consider a simplied version of the model with   0, 
!1,
 = 1; and a monetary policy satisfying (20) with  = y = 0, R > 1=2, EtR
m
t+1 < =,
and  = 1.
To establish the claims made in the rst part of the proposition, we separately examine
the exible price case and the sticky price case. Consider the model summarized in denition
3. The equilibrium sequences fyt, t, REulert , btg1t=0 are then characterized by (45)-(46), (48),
P0b0 = B 1, and yt = bt 1= (Rmt t). Using that (49) then holds (see proof of proposition
1) and (20), leads to
REulert = (R
m
t )
1 R  (1=Rm)1 R (=)= exp[(1=2)var("Rr;t )]; (57)
where we used that Et exp("
R
t+1) = exp[(1=2)var("
R
r;t )]. Next, substitute out the Euler rate
in (45) with (57), to get
yt = (1=R
m
t )
(1 )
1+n at; (58)
where   (=) (=)Rm exp[(1=2)var("Rr;t )]=(1+n). Further, substitute out output with
(58) in t = bt 1= (Rmt yt) (see 47), which leads to
t = (1=R
m
t )
1+n (1 R)
1+n bt 1=(at): (59)
The solutions (57)-(59) imply that output and ination decrease with the policy rate and
that the Euler rate increases with the policy rate.
Now consider the sticky price case, summarized in denition 4 with  = 1. Given that
the policy rate is exogenous, condition (55) reduces to  (1=2) (1 + n) 1 >   (1 + ),
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which is obviously satised, implying that the equilibrium is locally determined and the
stable eigenvalue is strictly positive (see proof of lemma 1). Hence, the unique solution to
the system (50)-(53), is given by the generic form bt = 1bbt 1 + 2R^mt + 5bat, byt = 3bbt 1 +
4R^
m
t + 6bat, and bbt = (1  1)bbt 1   2R^mt , where the stable eigenvalue is 1   1 2 (0; 1)
(see 1). Inserting these solutions into the two-dimensional system (53) and (56) for ;y = 0
leads to the following conditions for the coe¢ cient 2 and 4 :
@bt=@R^mt = 2 =    (1 + n) 1   (1  R) =	 < 0;
@byt=@R^mt = 4 =   [1 + 1 +  (1  R)] =	 < 0;
where 	 = 1 + 1 +  (1 + n) 1 > 0. Hence, in response to a monetary contraction,
R^mt > 0 ination and output decline, while the Euler rate, which satises (57) and thus
R^Eulert = (1  R)R^mt , increases.
Turning to the second part of the proposition, we use that the solution to the Euler rate
(57) holds regardless of the degree of price exibility. It implies the following solution for
the spread REulert =R
m
t :
REulert =R
m
t = (R
m
t )
 R  (1=Rm)1 R (=)= exp[(1=2)var("Rr;t )]: (60)
According to (60) the ratio REulert =R
m
t decreases with the policy rate and with its variance,
while Rmt = bt=yt (or in log-linearized terms R^
m
t =
bbt   byt) implies that REulert =Rmt is
negatively related to the bills-to-gdp ratio. The solutions (57) and (60) further imply that
the variance of the ratio REulert =R
m
t is larger than the variance of the Euler rate R
Euler
t for
a su¢ ciently large autocorrelation of the policy rate, R > 1=2. Using the approximations
log
 
REulert =R
m
t
  sEulert and logREulert  REulert   1, establishes the claims made in the
part 2 of the proposition.
A.3 Equilibrium conditions of the quantitative version
In this Appendix, we present the full set of equilibrium conditions for the quantitative
version of the model (as presented in Section 5.1).
Denition 5 A REE of the quantitative version of the model for REulert > R
m
t is given by
a set of sequences fct, yt, nt, xt, kt, wt, %t, vt, qt, t, mRt , mHt , bt, bTt ; mct, ~Zt, st, t, Rt,
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REulert = R
L
t ; R
q
tg1t=0 satisfying (26), (28)-(33), (36)-(39),
t = Et [(uc;t+1=t+1] ; (61)
ct + xt = m
H
t +m
R
t , (62)
bt 1= (Rmt t) = m
H
t  mHt 1 1t +mRt , (63)
nnt R
Euler
t = uc;twt; (64)
REulert = qt [Gt + (xt=xt 1)G
0
t]  Et

t+1
t
qt+1 (xt+1=xt)
2G0t+1

; (65)
qt = Et

t+1
t
(1  )mct+1 (yt+1=kt) + (1  ) t+1
t
qt+1

; (66)
%t = yt   wtnt   xt
 
2REulert   1

=REulert ; (67)
yt = atn

t k
1 
t 1 =st; (68)
yt = ct + xt; (69)
kt = (1  ) kt 1 + xtGt; (70)
(where uc;t = (ct   hct 1) , Gt = 1   12 (xt=xt 1   1)2 and G0t =   (xt=xt 1   1)) as well
as the transversality conditions, a monetary policy setting fRmt  1g1t=0, 
t > 0, and   ,
and a scal policy setting    1, for a given sequences fat,"tg1t=0 and feytg1t=0 (see below),
and initial values MH 1 > 0, B 1 > 0, B
T
 1 > 0, k 1 > 0, x 1 > 0, and s 1  1:
The e¢ cient output level eyt, which required for the interest rate rule (20), is jointly deter-
mined with the e¢ cient allocation of feyt; ent;ect;ekt; ext; eqtg1t=0 satisfying
en1+nt = eucteyt; eyt = atent ek1 t 1 , eyt = ect + ext; ekt = (1  )ekt 1 + extG (ext=ext 1) ;
1 = eqt [G (ext=ext 1) + (ext=ext 1)G0 (ext=ext 1)]  Et euct+1euct eqt+1 (ext+1=ext)2G0 (ext+1=ext)

;
eqt = Eteuct+1euct
h
(1  )
eyt+1=ekt+ (1  ) eqt+1i ;
where euct = (ect   h  ect 1)  given ex 1 > 0 and ek 1 > 0.
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B Further Appendices
B.1 Parameter values
Table A1 Benchmark parameter values
Subjective discount factor  = 0:993
Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity  = 1
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply n = 1
Substitution elasticity " = 13
Steady state working time n = 0:33
Labour share  = 0:66
Investment adjustment cost # = 0:065
Rate of depreciation of capital stock  = 0:025
Habit parameter h = 0:7
Fraction of non-price adjusting rms  = 0:8
Steady state interest rate Rm = 1:015 9
Share of repos to outright purchases 
 = 12
Steady state ination  = 1:011 3 (=  )
Policy rule coe¢ cients R = 0:73,  = 1:5, y = 0:78
Standard deviation of policy rate shocks sd("R;t) = 0:003
Autocorrelation of tfp-shocks A = 0:8
Standard deviation of tfp-shocks sd("A;t) = 0:0173
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B.2 Additional Figures
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